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Abstract
Early results of evolutionary game theory showed that the risk dominant
equilibrium is uniquely selected in the long run under the best-response
dynamics with mutation. Bergin and Lipman (1996) qualiﬁed this result
by showing that for a given population size the evolutionary process can
select any strict Nash equilibrium if the probability of choosing a nonbest
response is state-dependent. This paper shows that the unique selection
of the risk dominant equilibrium is robust with respect to state dependent
mutation in local interaction games. More precisely, for a given mutation
structure there exists a minimum population size beyond which the risk
dominant equilibrium is uniquely selected. Our result is driven by con-
tagion and cohesion among players, which exist only in local interaction
settings and favor the risk dominant strategy. Our result strengthens the
equilibrium selection result of evolutionary game theory.
Keywords: Contagion, state dependent mutations, risk dominance, local
interaction games.
JEL classiﬁcation: C72; D833
1 Introduction
Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) and Young (1993) showed that the risk
dominant equilibrium is uniquely selected for global interaction games
with mutation under the best-response dynamics. When a group of agents
playa givencoordination gameamong themselvesand thereis asmall mu-
tation probability that each agent may choose a strategy that is not a best
response, the risk dominant equilibrium is selected uniquely as the prob-
ability of mutation vanishes to zero. While the strength of the result fol-
lows from the parsimony of the model, Bergin and Lipman (1996) showed
that the result depends crucially on the mutation parameters of the model.
In particular the equilibrium selection result may be overturned in favor
of the payo dominant equilibrium if state dependent mutation is allowed
and the ratio of the mutation probabilities becomes unbounded in the limit.
If agents are more cautious when playing the payo dominant action than
the risk dominant action and make fewer mistakes or experiment less, then
playing payo dominant action remains the long-run equilibrium.
This paper reexamines the argument of Bergin and Lipman for equi-
librium selection in the context of local interaction games i.e., in games
where each player interacts only with a subset of the population called
neighbors. We show that for a given mutation structure there exists a min-
imum ﬁnite population size such that for population size above that level,
the risk dominant equilibrium is uniquely selected. This result is driven by
the speciﬁc feature of local interaction games that the equilibrium selec-
tion depends on the size of the population. This is also the reason why we
obtain a dierent result from that of Bergin and Lipman (1996). They take
the population size as given, and then pick a mutation structure that selects
some long run equilibrium. In contrast, we ﬁx the mutation structure ﬁrst,
then we set the ﬁnite population size suciently so that the risk dominant
equilibrium is selected. Since the equilibrium selection is independent of
the population size in global interaction games [see the motivating exam-
pleinBerginandLipman(1996)], insuchanenvironmentitdoesnotmake
a dierence which parameter is regarded as ﬁxed relative to the other one.
In contrast, it does matter for local interaction games. The crucial require-
ment is that the ratio of the mutation probabilities remains bounded as the
population size changes. For example, this requirement is satisﬁed if the
mutation structure depends only on the local conﬁguration, which seems
coherent with the approach of the local interaction games.
The nature of our result is easiest to understand in the model where
agents play against the nearest neighbors on a circle of size N as in El-
lison’s (1993) example. Assume that the probability of nonbest reply is4
smaller when playing the payo dominant action than when playing the
risk dominant action. Note that if there are two adjacent players playing
the risk dominant action, they continue to play it independent of the strat-
egy proﬁle played in the remainder of the circle. Moreover local interac-
tion environment allows that one particular strategy can spread gradually
through the population from one neighborhood to the next i.e., it allows
for contagion. This works determininistically in one dimension because
the neighbors of the two players mentioned above simply switch to the
risk dominant action in the next period in the absence of mutation. Thus,
transition from the conﬁguration of playing the payo dominant strategy
everywhere to that of playing risk dominant strategy everywhere takes just
2 mutations. In contrast, transition from the conﬁguration of playing the
risk dominant strategy everywhere to that of playing the payo dominant
strategy everywhere requires N simultaneous mutations because of cohe-
sion among players playing the risk dominant strategy. The number of
mutations required to make a transition to the state of playing the risk
dominant strategy everywhere is independent of the population size while
the transition to the state of playing the payo dominant strategy every-
where depends on the population size. Therefore, if the population is big
enough, the latter transition probability can be made much smaller than
the former if the mutation structure across the two strategies is taken as
ﬁxed.
More generally, we demonstrate the above result in an environment
where the players are located on a two dimensional torus and they inter-
act with their nearest neighbors. We have chosen this structure for two
reasons. First, this relatively simple setup shares some fundamental fea-
turesofmoregenerallocalinteractionenvironments: itallowsforcohesive
groups formed by players located close to each other, and, in contrast to
the one dimensional case, it makes contagion a stochastic phenomenon.
Thus, it requires a non-trivial generalization of the one dimensional ar-
gument. Secondly, this environment is the simplest one that allows us to
show how to apply some useful tools to study local interaction environ-
ments. We explore the general idea of renormalization based on cohesion
and we characterize the evolution in terms of connected islands of players
playing the same strategy.
The basic mechanism that characterizes local interaction environments
is the presence of contagion. This mechanism is fairly trivial and deter-
ministic in the one dimensional setup. In contrast, it is fundamentally
stochastic in two dimensions. To see this point, consider a two dimen-
sional large torus and suppose that all agents on a square of side length 2
play the risk dominant strategy. It is easy to see that these agent continue5
to play the risk dominant strategy regardless of the strategy proﬁle in the
remainder of the torus without mutation. Hence the square plays a similar
role to the 2 adjacent agents playing the risk dominant strategy on the cir-
cle. However the risk dominant strategy doesnot spread beyond the square
in the absence of an additional agent playing it next to the square. We need
further mutations to induce contagion, which is a stochastic event. Hence
we consider the analysis as an exercise on the interaction of contagion dy-
namics and mutation dynamics. Without mutation (or initial randomness
as in Lee and Valentinyi (2000)), there is no seed for contagion to work
on; however if there is a little mutation or randomness that contagion can
work on, the rest is driven by the contagion, and not mutation.
To simplify the analysis we rely on two ideas. The ﬁrst one is renor-
malization which makes use of the following observations. If all members
of a group play the risk dominant strategy and these players never abandon
it without mutation, then we say that the environment allows for cohesive
groups. The smallest such a group is called a team, and a team is said
to play the risk dominant strategy if and only if all of its team members
play it. This construction ensures that if a team plays the risk dominant
strategy, then so does all of its members in the original process. However,
if a player plays the risk dominant strategy in the original process, it may
belong to a team that plays the payo dominant strategy. It follows that
if we want to show that the whole population eventually adopts the risk
dominant strategy, then it is sucient to show that the population of teams
adopts it. The switch from players to teams is called renormalization. The
advantage of the renormalized process is that teams playing the risk dom-
inant strategy never disappear unless their members mutate. Thus, the
set of teams playing the risk dominant strategy can only grow over time
without mutation, but cannot shrink.
Our second idea deals with the problem of having a large and com-
plicated state space. Indeed, for a torus of size N, the number of states
is 2N. The following argument enables us to simplify the analysis of this
large state space. Note that each conﬁguration contains a (possibly empty)
connected island of teams playing the risk dominant strategy. We show
that the transition from one state to another depends crucially on the size
of the largest such island contained in the conﬁguration. More precisely,
in a two dimensional environment we need only to know the size of the
largest square of teams playing the risk dominant strategy contained in
a conﬁguration to estimate the transition probabilities to the other states.
The intuitive reason is the following: small squares of teams playing the
risk dominant strategy disappear with few mutations. In contrast, large
squares are more dicult to break because the required number of muta-6
tions is proportional to their size. Therefore, the size of the largest square
is pivotal in determining the transition to another state. In particular, we
show that once the process reached a state which contains a square of crit-
ical size where all teams in the square play the risk dominant strategy,
that square exhibits a strong growth property. Thus, contagion makes it
very likely that it grows further ensuring convergence to the risk dominant
equilibrium.
Recently a number of papers have analyzed local interaction games.
For instance Anderlini and Ianni (1996), Bala and Goyal (1998), Blume
(1993, 1994, 1995), Lee and Valentinyi (2000) and Morris (2000) exam-
ined the issue of equilibrium selection in local interaction games with and
without mutation. However, none of these papers addresses the issue for
the analysis of robustness of the equilibrium selection to state dependent
mutations. Our idea about how to analyze the complicated state space
is related to the recent work of Ellison (2000). He develops a powerful
technique for the determination of the long-run distribution of a stochas-
tic process when there are many limit states in the system. This also can
be applied in local interacting settings. He focuses on how the system
evolves step-by-step from one limit set to the next. In a similar spirit,
we focus on how the system evolves from one conﬁguration containing
a large connected island of players playing the risk dominant strategy to
the next similar conﬁguration. However, it is not clear from Ellison’s ar-
gument why step-by-step evolution should favor the selection of the risk
dominant equilibrium. Our paper demonstrates why the dynamics of the
local interaction model favors the selection of risk-dominant equilibrium.
Since Bergin and Lipman (1996) suggested a careful examination of
implication of the state dependent mutation, more attention has been paid
to the issue. For instance van Damme and Weibull (2000) examine the
decision making process associated with the cost of mistake. They con-
clude that the introduction of state dependent mutation does not overturn
the standard equilibrium selection result since the concern for the cost of
mistake favors the mutation toward the risk dominant strategy. Similarly,
Young (1998) investigates whether one can relax the uniformity of muta-
tioninaplausiblewaywithoutchangingthestochasticallystableoutcome.
Although reﬁning the decision making process is an important issue, we
believe that it is at least as important to prove the robustness of the equi-
librium selection result for a certain environment. In particular, since any
reﬁnement is susceptible to a perturbation of how the reﬁnement has been
made, it is important to establish the robustness of mutation for an impor-
tant environment.
The rest of the paper organized as follows. Section 2 describes a 2-7
dimensional environment of local interaction. Section 3 contains the main
result of the paper. This section starts with a renormalization argument,
then characterizes the stochastically stable outcome using a series of lem-
mas and propositions. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 Local Interaction Game
2.1 A framework of local interaction
There is a population of N2 players located on a 2-dimensional torus
(N) = Z2 \ [0;N)2 (mod N) for N  1. A player with address x 2 (N)
interacts with her nearest neighbors. The set of neighbors for the origin
is deﬁned by N  fy : kyk = 1g where kyk  (jy1j + jy2j), and the set of
neighbors for player x is given by x + N  fy : kx   yk = 1g; namely the
translation of N by x.
There are two actions fA; Bg; and pure strategies st : (N)  ! fA; Bg.
We characterize the population at time t in terms of the set of players
playing A, thus
S t = fx : st(x) = A; x 2 (N)g: (1)
2.2 Coordination game
Consider the 2  2 coordination game given in Table 1. We require that
a > c, d > b and (a   c) > (d   b) so that both (A;A) and (B; B) are Nash




Table 1: Coordination Game
All players play the game simultaneously over discrete periods and in-
ﬁnite horizon. The feature of local interaction is reﬂected in that the payo
of each player depends on the strategy played by herself and everyone in
the neighborhood. The payo of player x playing strategy A in period t is
given by
ut(x;A) = b + (a   b)
jS t \ (x + N)j
jx + Nj
; (2a)8
where j  j denotes the cardinality of a set. Similarly, the payo of player
x playing strategy B in period t is given by
ut(x; B) = d + (c   d)
jS t \ (x + N)j
jx + Nj
: (2b)
In the absence of mutation, players are assumed to play the myopic best-




Thus player x plays A in period t + 1 if




(a   c) + (d   b)
 : (4)
Since (A;A) is the risk dominant equilibrium,  < 1=2. This describes the
dynamics of the model without mutations.
2.3 State Dependent Mutation
Weintroducemutationintothemodel: theagentmaymakeamistakeoran
experiment and thus chooses a strategy at random with a small probabil-
ity. In particular we consider a stochastic process fS "
tgt0 which is derived
from fS tgt0, allowing for randomness due to mutation. In the conﬁgura-
tion of the noise structure, we recognize explicitly the possibility of state
dependent mutation probabilities.
State dependent mutations are allowed for in the following framework.
Let
p : (N)  [0;1]  fA; Bg(N)  fA; Bg  ! [0;1]
beamapassigningtwonon-negativenumbers, p(x;";S;A)and p(x;";S; B);
to player x that represent the probability of mutation to A and B, respec-
tively. We require that p(x;";S;A)+ p(x;";S; B) 2 [0;1]. The probability
depends on the location of the player, on the overall state of the economy,
on the state of the player and on a scaling parameter ".
Deﬁneft(x)gx2(N) forallt asacollectionofindependentrandomvari-
ables uniformly distributed on [0;1], and deﬁne Xt as:
Xt+1(x;S t;") =
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
A if t(x)  p(x;";S "
t;A)




Thus, agent x in state S t mutates to A in period t + 1 if Xt(x;S t;") = A;
mutates to B if Xt(x;S t;") = B; and does not mutate otherwise. Also note
that fXt(x;S t;")gx2(N) is a collection of random variables for each t that
are independent across players and time. The speciﬁcation ensures that the
mutation probability depends on the state of the population, the location of
the agent, and so on. In particular, the state of the population includes the
stateofagent xsothatthemutationprobabilitymaybedierentdepending
on whether the agent plays A or B and one strategy may be chosen with
a higher mutation probability than the other one. To simplify notation we
drop the arguments S t;" from Xt(x;S t;") and use Xt(x) if it does not lead
to confusion.
We make the following assumption about the mutation structure.
Assumption 1 The mutation probability satisﬁes:
1. lim"!0 p(x;";S; ) = 0 for all x 2 (N) and S  (N), and










p(x;";S; B) = "(B): (6b)
The ﬁrst assumption is standard. The second one requires that the muta-
tion probabilities are uniformly bounded across agents, states and popu-
lations sizes i.e., "(A) and "(B) are the lower bound and upper bound on
the probability that an agent chooses strategy A and B as a consequence of
mutation, respectively. This assumption is not more restrictive than other
similar assumptions used in the literature (see Ellison (2000) and Young
(1993) for example). Note that "(B) can be of a lower order than "(A),
so that the ratio of the mutation probabilities may well be unbounded as
" # 0, and also B can be adopted increasingly more frequently than A as
" # 0. Hence this is compatible with the environment for which Bergin-
Lipman’s result holds for a given population size.
Using the construction, the transition rule for the process fS "
tgt0 can
be formally written as
S "















This construction deﬁnes a Markov-chain S "
t.10
Denoting the event where everybody plays A by ~ A, we are interested
in the long-run probability of the event ~ A:
"(~ A) = lim
t!1
Pr(S "
t = (N)): (8)
which is the same as the probability of ~ A under the invariant distribution
of S "
t. In particular our main goal is to characterize "(~ A) as " # 0.
3 Best Response Dynamics with State Depen-
dent Mutations
Our analysis of the long-run distribution of the population consists of two
steps. First, we construct a new process which satisﬁes a sample path
inequality with respect to the original process; the sample path inequality
then implies a certain distributional inequality.1 Secondly, we characterize
the long-run distribution for the new process and deduce the properties of
the limiting distribution of the original process using the distributional
inequality. The main beneﬁt of the stepwise approach is the analytical
convenience the new process provides.
3.1 Renormalization and Coupling Argument
Suppose that N is even.2 Let (M) be a torus where M  N=2, and assign
to each y 2 (M) a set of four players from the original torus (N) by
H(y) =
n
x 2 (N) : xi 2 f2yi;2yi + 1g;i = 1;2;y 2 (M)
o
: (9)
We call y and x 2 H(y) a team and a team member, respectively. We
shall also refer to the population of teams as the renormalized population.
Let zt : (M)  ! fA; Bg be a map which represents the state of team y
at time t; which will be deﬁned shortly. As before, we characterize the
dynamics of the population in terms of the set of teams playing A, thus
Z"
t = fy : zt(y) = Ag. We construct an initial conﬁguration Z"
0, and a
transition rule such that that if the state of a team is A, then all of its team
members play A in the original population.3
First, we deﬁne the initial state for the renormalized process. At time
zero, a team is said to play A if all of its members in the original population
1This is called the coupling technique. See Aldous and Fill (1999, Chapter 14).
2We discuss later what happens if N is odd.
3On the other hand we do not require if a team plays B, then all members play B.11
play A; otherwise it plays B. Formally, Z"
0 is deﬁned by
Z"










fx 2 H(y) : y 2 Z0g  S 0: (12)
Thus, the set of agents belonging to teams playing A in the initial period
is a subset of the set of agents playing A in the original population.
Secondly, we construct the transition rule for the renormalized process
without mutation such that the condition fx 2 H(y) : y 2 Ztg  S t (if a
team plays A, then all of its members in the original population play A)
is satisﬁed for all t  0. Observe that if all members of a team play A
in the original population, then the best response for all team members is
A. Therefore, if a team plays A, it will never adopt B in the absence of
mutation. Moreover, let
Gi(y) = fy   ei;y + eig; for i = 1;2 where e1 = (1;0) e2 = (0;1):
That is, Gi(y) represents the two neighbors of team y in coordinate direc-
tion i. It is easy to see that if a team playing B encounters two other teams
all of whose members are playing A in two dierent coordinate directions,
then all members of the team adopt A in at most 3 periods under the orig-
inal process (see Figure 1 where the reference to time indicates the period
when the agent adopts A).
For future reference we summarize the transition rule for the renor-
malized process in the absence of mutation by the following lemma.
Lemma 1 (Contagion) In the absence of mutations
1. if a team y plays A, then never adopts B,
2. if a team y has at least one member playing B, then all of its mem-
bers adopt A if Gi(y) \ Z"
t , ? for both i = 1 and i = 2.
Thirdly, we construct a random variable representing mutations for the
renormalizedpopulationusingtherandomvariablerepresentingmutations
for the original population. We do so in two steps. Let
t(x) =
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
A if t(x)  "(A)
B if t(x)  1   "(B)
0 otherwise:
(13)12

































 agents playing A in period t
The construction ensures that the event ft(x) = Ag implies fXt(x) = Ag,




> > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > :
A if 3t(x) = A 8 x 2 H(y)
0 if n(x) , B 8 x 2 H(y) and n = 3t   2;3t   1;3t;
and 3t(x) , A
B otherwise:
(14)
In words fYt(y) = Ag is the event in which all team members mutate to
A in period 3t, fYt(y) = 0g is the event that no mutation to B occurred
during the periods 3t   2;3t   1;3t, and we are not in the previous case.
Finally, fYt(y) = Bg is the event that at least one team mutates to B during
the periods 3t   2;3t   1;3t, and all team members do not mutate to A in
period 3t.
There are two important facts about Yt(x). First, the construction of
Yt(x) and Lemma 1 ensure that the stochastic process for the renormalized
population is a Markov process. Secondly, the timing for the renormal-
ized population is dierent from that of the original population. As we
can see on Figure 1, it takes three periods under the original process for all
team members to adopt A. Therefore the clock for the renormalized pop-
ulation ticks slower: three periods under the original process correspond
to one period under the renormalized one. This is reﬂected by the timing
convention used in the deﬁnition of the random variable Yt(x).
We can use Assumption 1 to provide bounds on the events that a team
mutates to A or to B. Setting ¯ (A) = 4(A), we obtain
Pr(Yt(y) = A) = "¯ (A): (15a)13
Moreover, a team mutates to B with probability at most 12"(B). For small
" there is a ¯ (B) such that this probability is at most "¯ (B) i.e.,
Pr(Yt(y) = B)  "¯ (B) (15b)
Finally, after the construction of the transition rule without mutations,
and deﬁning the random variable representing mutations for the teams, we






















Equation (16) can be decomposed to three transition mechanisms: con-
tagion, cohesion, and mutation. Contagion is represented by the ﬁrst
bracket. If team y is playing B at time t, and meets two other teams play-
ing A in two dierent coordinate directions, it chooses A at time t + 1.
Since we require that neither team y nor any of the two other teams mutate
at time t + 1, the construction in (14) implies that no members of any of
these three teams mutated in the original process at 3t + 1;3t + 2;3t + 3.
Therefore, all members of team y make a transition from B to A during
3t+1;3t+2;3t+3. Consequently, all players in these three teams plays A
at time 3t + 3 in the original process. Cohesion is captured by the second
bracket. It indicates that a team playing A continues with the same choice
in the absence of mutation. Since Yt+1(y) = 0 implies that no member of
team y mutates during 3t + 1;3t + 2;3t + 3, all members of team y play A
at time 3t + 3 in the original process. Mutation is represented by the last
bracket. Again, the construction of mutation for teams ensures that if team
y mutates to A at time t + 1, so do all team members at time 3t + 3 in the
original process.
All three mechanisms are inherited from the original population; re-
normalization makes cohesion explicit and simpliﬁes the way contagion
works. The above decomposition also highlights the analytical advantage
of working with the renormalized process rather then the original one.
Transition from B to A can take place both in the presence and the absence
of mutation in the original process. In contrast, transition from B to A
takes place only as a consequence of mutation in the renormalized process.
This simpliﬁes the derivation of the limit distribution of the renormalized
process.
It follows from our discussion above that our construction ensures
the desired relationship between the original and renormalized process as
stated in the next proposition.14
Proposition 1 The process fZ"
t gt0 governed by the transition rule (16)
and starting from the initial condition (10) satisﬁes
fx 2 H(y) : y 2 Z"
t g  S "
3t: (17)
for all t.
Proposition 1 in turn has an important consequence for our analysis cap-
tured by the following statement. Let "(~ A) be the long run probability of
the event where all teams play A.
Corollary 1 If lim"!0 "(~ A) = 1, then lim"!0 "(~ A) = 1.
Proof. It suces to prove that " dominates ", i.e. "(~ A)  "(~ A): This
follows from equation (17) i.e., the event that Z"
1 = (M) implies the
event that S "
1 = (N). 
3.2 Contagion versus State Dependent Mutation
This subsection presents the main result of the paper. Our main goal is
to demonstrate that for any state dependent mutation structure satisfying
the conditions in Assumption 1, contagion dominates mutation: given the
mutationstructure, theriskdominantequilibriumwillbeuniquelyselected
in the long run for a suuciently large but ﬁnite population.
The proof is built around two important concepts.
Deﬁnition 1 (Lock-in) A state Z is called a lock-in if no team changes
strategy in the absence of mutation. The set of these states is denoted by
L.
If strategy A does not spread further through contagion, then the state is a
lock-in.4 The next concept is new.
Deﬁnition 2 (k-restricted lock-in) Draw an M  M square representa-
tion of the torus. Denote the “left-upper” k  k square by R(k). For state
Z, deﬁne the restriction of Z to R(k) to be a state where all teams inside
R(k) play the strategy according to Z while all teams outside R(k) play B.
If the restriction of Z to R(k) is a lock-in, then Z is called a k-restricted
lock-in. The set of k-restricted lock-ins is denoted by Lk.
4This state is also called a limit set of the mutationless process in the literature.15












 agents playing A in period t
Put dierently, we treat all teams outside R(k) as if they played B. If
no team ever adopts A inside R(k) due to contagion, then Z 2 Lk. The
deﬁnition describes the set of states where the conﬁguration outside R(k)
does not generate contagion5 i.e., there are no contagious eects coming
from outside R(k). It is easy to see that a k-restricted lock-in is also an
l-restricted lock-in for all l < k. Although a restricted lock-in is not neces-
sarily a lock-in, any lock-in Z is a k-restricted lock-in for all k < M.
We start by proving a preparatory lemma. Let LA
k be the set of k-
restricted lock-ins with all teams in R(k) playing A. Moreover, let Zk be
the set of conﬁgurations where at least k teams in R(k) play B.
Lemma 2 If Z 2 L   ~ A i.e, fZ 2 L : Z , ~ Ag, then Z 2 ZM i.e., it contains
at least M teams playing B. If Z 2 Lk   LA
k, then Z 2 Zk i.e., it contains
at least k teams playing B.
Proof. Consider the statement for lock-ins. Observe that it is sucient
for the whole population to adopt A in the absence of mutation if at least
M teams play A at t = 0 and these teams are located on a diagonal [see
the illustration in Figure 2a]. It is easy to see that all teams next to the
diagonal have two neighbors in two dierent coordinate directions playing
A. Therefore these teams adopt A by lemma 1. Applying induction, we
obtain that all teams adopt A at t = M   1.
Next, suppose that at most M   1 teams play B initially. To see that
such a conﬁguration cannot be a lock-in, note that a torus of size M  M
5To ensure that the teams at the boundary of the M  M square have a regular neigh-
borhood structure, we assume that there is an (M + 1)st row and column of teams all
playing B for all t  0.16
can be viewed as an object consisting of M parallel diagonals of length M.
If at most M   1 teams play B at t = 0, there must be at least one diagonal
on the torus on which all teams play A. Hence our previous argument
implies that the the whole population adopts A which proves the ﬁrst part
of our lemma.
Now consider the statement for k-restricted lock-ins. Since a k-restric-
ted lock-in is not a torus but a square which cannot be viewed as an object
consisting of parallel diagonals, the previous argument cannot be applied
directly. However, a redeﬁnition of the concept “diagonal” for squares
solves our problem. View R(k) as consisting of an upper and a lower tri-
angle plus the main diagonal. Pick up a diagonal of length n1 from the
upper triangle and the corresponding diagonal of length n2 = k   n1 from
the lower triangle. Let a “diagonal” be deﬁned by these two pieces. The
k   1 such “diagonals” plus the main diagonal give us k “diagonals”. Ele-
mentary argument shows that if any of the constructed diagonals contains
k teams playing A, all teams in R(k) eventually adopt A in the absence of
mutation [see the illustration in Figure 2b]. Therefore our previous argu-
ment applies proving the second part of the lemma. 
These two results are a very useful when we need to know the minimum
number of mutations required to leave the basin of attraction of ~ A or a
k-restricted lock-in with all teams in R(k) playing A.
After this preparation, we shall characterize the limit distribution of
the process fZ"
t g using a result on ﬁrst passage times. First, we introduce
some notation. Let Z and Z0 be two states and TZ = infft > 0 : Z"
t = Zg be
the ﬁrst passage time to state Z. Let
Pr Z(Z"




Pr Z(E) = inf
Z2Z
Pr Z(E)
for an event E and Z  (M). We use the following well-known identity
for ergodic Markov-processes to characterize the long run distribution [see










T~ A < TZ
 (18)
To show that for a given mutation structure, ~ A is played most of the time
in a suciently large but ﬁnite population as " # 0, we look for an ap-
propriate upper bound in terms of " on the above ratio. We estimate the
numerator and denominator separately. The key is to estimate the latter.17
Now we turn to the proof for the main theorem which is constructed
via three lemmas. Although they are somewhat technical, we believe that
there is a clear intuition behind each of these lemmas. The ﬁrst lemma es-
tablishes the order of the probability of getting from one lock-in to another
one which has “fewer teams” playing A.
Lemma 3 Let Z and Z0 be two lock-ins with Z * Z0. The probability of
getting from lock-in Z to lock-in Z0 without hitting any other lock-in is
given by
Pr Z(TZ0 < TL Z0) = O("¯ (A)jZnZ0j): (19)
Proof. We estimate the following sum
Pr Z(TZ0 < TL Z0) =
1 X
t=1
Pr Z(TZ0 = t;TL Z0 > t):
First, observe that for any t, the event fTZ0 = t;TL Z0 > tg requires that the
process leaves Z in the ﬁrst period since Z 2 L   Z0. Next, if the process
leaves Z, at least one team adopts A in every period due to contagion until
the next lock-in is reached. Since the process may hit ~ A at time t = M2,
we need at least maxft   M2;0g mutations to B not to hit a lock-in by
time t. Moreover, since Z * Z0 and transition from A to B is not possible
without mutation, we need at least jZnZ0j more mutations to B to reach
Z0. Thus, reaching Z0 by time t without hitting any other lock-in along
a given trajectory has probability at most "¯ (B)(jZj jZ0j+maxft M2;0g). We have
to multiply this value by the number of possible trajectories. Since each
trajectory is t long, by choosing a suciently large K depending only on
M, we can estimate this number by Kt.6 For " suciently small, the sum
in the inequality




is convergent. Indeed the sum is O(1) which proves our claim. 
Note that any conﬁguration with fewer then M teams playing B(other then
~ A) is not a lock-in by Lemma 2. Therefore this lemma also implies that
if the process starts from ~ A, the probability that it hits any conﬁguration
with at least M teams playing B before getting back to ~ A is bounded from
above by K"¯ (A)M.
6Dierent K’s appearing in dierent formulas may be dierent.18
The next lemma formulates a “local” version of this observation. In
words, thelemmasaysthattheprobabilityofleavingaconﬁgurationwhich
contains a k  k square of teams playing A and returning to a similar con-
ﬁguration before hitting a state where the k  k square has at least a row
or column of players playing B is bounded by some constant multiple of
"¯ (B)k. This local version of the previous lemma will make it possible to
track the evolution of the process more closely and in the end prove our
main claim.







 K"¯ (B)k: (20)
Proof. The proof is based on the construction of a shadow process Z
k;"
t ,
which is intended to keep track of only those events taking place inside
of R(k). We prove the claim for the shadow process making use of the
previous lemma and then we transform the result to Z"
t by using a coupling
argument.
First we construct the shadow process as follows. At the initial state,
teams inside R(k) in Z
k;"
0 play the same strategy they play in Z"
0. However,
teams outside R(k) in Z
k;"
0 play B. This is to ensure that we focus only on
the“localproblem”i.e., whathappensinsideR(k). Wedeﬁnethetransition
rule as follows. Teams inside R(k) in Z
k;"









It is easy to see that Z
k;"
t  Z"
t for all t  0. It is true for t = 0 by
construction. Since no team ever plays A outside R(k) in Z
k;"
t , we have
to show only that our claim is true inside R(k). First, mutation generates
teams playing A under Z
k;"
t whenever it does so under Z"
t . Secondly, since
contagion is induced only by A and teams outside R(k) play B forever,
teams outside R(k) have no contagious eects on teams inside R(k) in Z
k;"
t .
Since this is not true for Z"




Consider now the shadow process Z
k;"
t . Lemmas 2 and 3 imply for the
shadow process that the probability of getting to Zk before returning to
LA





t hits Zk, then so does Z
k;"
t , and conversely if Z
k;"
t returns to LA
k,
then so does Z"
t . It follows that the event that Z"
t hits Zk before returning
to LA
k implies the event that Z
k;"
t hits Zk before returning to LA
k. Thus if
7Note that from the point of view of the shadow process the set LA
k could be consid-
ered to be a singleton since teams outside R(k) do not count anyway.19
the required inequality holds for Z
k;"
t , then it also holds for Z"
t . The lemma
is proved. 
The next lemma builds on the previous two lemmas to provide the key








where d:e is the ceiling function (the next integer up if ¯ (A)=¯ (B) is not an




T~ A < TZ
 = O(" ¯ (A)m) (22)
for any Z 2 L   ~ A.
Proof. We construct an event which is a subset of the event fT~ A < TZg, and
estimate its probability from below. The key step of the proof is to show
that for all k  m play A, there is a positive probability independent of "
that all teams in R(k + 1) will play A before returning to Z. Thus m plays
the role of a critical mass: once a suciently large set of teams (measured
by m) play A, it is easy to proceed. So the diculty lies in reaching this
critical mass of m, and hence the bound "¯ (A)m.
Since Z 2 L  ~ A, it follows from lemma 2 that state Z contains at least
M teamsplaying B. Drawan MM squarerepresentationofthetorussuch
that the uppermost and leftmost team plays B in Z. Denote the “left upper”
k k square in this M  M torus by R(k), and the set of diagonal elements
by D(k). Observe that this construction ensures that Z 2 Lk   LA
k for all
k = m;:::; M which implies by lemma 2 that Z 2 Zk for all k = m;:::; M.
ToestimatePr Z






















To see why this inequality holds, ﬁrst note that LA
M = ~ A. Next observe that
the ﬁrst term is the probability that the process visits an m-restricted lock-
in where all teams in R(m) play A before getting back to Z. The second
term is the product of probabilities. Each term in this product measures
the probability that the process passes from a k-restricted lock-in to a k+1-
restricted lock-in without hitting Zk. Along such a path the process does
not hit Z because Z 2 Zk for all k = m;:::; M. Since this chain of events20
is sucient but not necessary for
n
T~ A < TZ
o
to occur, its probability is a
lower bound on Pr Z

T~ A < TZ

. Thus the inequality indeed holds.
We now turn to estimate each term on the right hand side of the above
inequality separately. We shall complete this estimation in two steps.
Step 1. Suppose that at least the teams in D(m) mutate to A in the ini-
tial period and no mutations to B take place during the next m periods.
Lemma 1 implies that all teams in R(m) play A after at most m periods,






 K1"¯ (A)m (24)




out hitting Zk is bounded from below by a constant independently of ".
To ﬁnd this bound we recycle our construction of the shadow process from







Z be the ith hitting times of the shadow process Z
k;"
t on some





















B B B B @
The team in D(k + 1)=D(k) does not mutate
to A in Z"




k, but it does at the ith time.
1
C C C C A
 Pr

No mutation to B occurs in (M) for
k + 1 periods

:
The right hand side captures the following event. The shadow process
starting from LA
k returns to LA
k several times without hitting Zk. One of
these times the next team along the diagonal mutates to A. Finally, no
mutation takes place for the next k + 1 periods after that. We can write
the probability of this joint event in a product form because of the Markov
propertyandbecausetheshadowprocessisindependentofwhatmutations
take place outside R(k) in Z"
t (and of course D(k+1)=D(k) is outside R(k)).
If this joint event happens, then all teams in R(k) play A in Z"
t and Z"
t
did not hit Zk on the way because Z
k;"
t  Z"
t by construction. Since the
next team along the diagonal mutated to A, and no mutations happened
afterwards for k + 1 periods, contagion drove all teams in R(k + 1) to play
A in the end. Therefore the probability of this joint event is indeed a lower
bound for the left-hand side.21
We estimate each term on the right hand side separately. The strong
Markov property of the stopping times ˜ Ti
LA
k
, i = 1;2;::: and Lemma 4











1   K"¯ (B)ki


1   K"¯ (A)i
;
where we use the fact that ¯ (A)  ¯ (B)k for all k  m by construction.
The second term is equal to

1   "¯ (A)i 1
"¯ (A). Finally, the probability of
the third term i.e., that no team mutates to B for k + 1 periods is bounded
from below by

1   "¯ (B)M2(k+1)
.











1   K"¯ (A)i 
1   "¯ (A)i 1
"¯ (A) 
1   "¯ (B)M2(k+1)
= "¯ (A)(1   "¯ (B))M2(k+1) 1   K"¯ (A)
K"¯ (A) + "¯ (A)   K"2¯ (A)
 "¯ (A)(1   "¯ (B))M2(k+1) 1   K"¯ (A)
(1 + K)"¯ (A)  K2: (25)
for some K2 > 0 independent of ". The second step is complete.
Putting the results from equation (24) and (25) together proves the
lemma. 
The heart of the previous lemma is step 2 where we assess the outcome of
a “race”: the next diagonal team needs to mutates to A before too many
teams at wrong locations inside R(k) mutate to B. The probability of the
event that the next diagonal team mutates to A at each occasion when all
teams play A inside R(k) is "¯ (A). The probability of the event that the
process hits a k-restricted lock-in with positive number of teams playing B
in R(k) is at most K"¯ (B)k. The fact that the ratio of these two probabilities
is bounded from below by a constant for k  m implies that the set of
teams playing A has a strong growth property for small ". This is due
to two factors. One is cohesion: once a large group of teams plays A, it
is very hard to destroy them. Secondly, contagion ensures that only one
additional team is required for the large group playing A to grow beyond
its boundaries. Intuitively, m acts as a “critical mass” in the argument;
once the teams in R(m) play A, the critical mass has been reached and it is
easy to proceed.
The next theorem states our main result.
Theorem 1 For M  m2,
lim
"!0
"(~ A) = 1;22
where m is deﬁned in equation (21).
Proof. Weproveourclaimintwosteps. TheﬁrststepfocusesonZ 2 L ~ A
whereas the second step considers Z < L.




P~ A(TZ < T~ A)
PZ(T~ A < TZ)
:
Since Z is a lock-in and Z , ~ A, Z has at least M teams playing B. It
follows from Lemma 3 that




Indeed, starting from ~ A, the ﬁrst lock-in on the way requires at least M
mutations to B.
Moreover, the previous lemma implies
1





for M  m.











as " ! 0.
Step 2. Consider the states Z < L. Let ˆ Z be the state to which Z converges




Pˆ Z(TZ < T ˆ Z)
PZ(T ˆ Z < TZ)
:
The denominator is of order 1, because if no mutation occurs for the next
M2 periods (which happens with probability approaching 1) then we hit ˆ Z
without hitting Z for sure. The numerator goes to zero as " ! 0 because
of Assumption 1. Indeed, a mutation is required in the ﬁrst step, otherwise
we would stay at ˆ Z. The aforementioned condition guarantees that all










for any Z such that Z , ~ A. The proof is complete. 
Putting together this result and Proposition 1 yields that for N  2M
even, the only long-run stochastically stable set of the original fS "
tgt0 pro-
cess is ~ A.
It remains to consider the situation when N is odd. Let N = 2M + 1.
Consider a a 2M  2M rectangle on the torus. Note that throughout the
proofs so far we have not used the fact that the environment is a torus,
and not an M  M square. Thus the theorem is applicable for the 2M 
2M square on the torus. Note that if all teams in the 2M  2M square
are playing A, then contagion in the absence of mutation implies that the
(2M + 1)st column and row will also play A in a ﬁnite time period. Since
mutation probabilities go to zero, we can conclude that ~ A is the only long-
run stochastically stable set of the game for N = 2M + 1 too. Thus the
following corollary holds.
Corollary 2 For N  2m2 we have
lim
"!0
"(~ A) = 1




In contrast to the crucial role of state dependent mutation in the equi-
librium selection for global interaction games, the details of the muta-
tion structure do not matter much for local interaction games. The result
strengthens the equilibrium selection result of the evolutionary game the-
ory. Moreover it justiﬁes the approach that deliberately avoids a detailed
formulation of the decision making process. Finally considering the fact
that the situations captured by the approach are mainly social phenom-
ena involving many loosely-related agents, the local interaction frame-
work could be a better description of the reality than the global interaction
framework.24
Our proof uses two basic features of the local interaction environment.
First, it allows for cohesive groups based on the risk dominant strategy
which make the the risk dominant strategy more resistant to mutations rel-
ative to the payo dominant strategy. Secondly, the environment is su-
ciently connected that contagion can propagate the risk dominant strategy
through the whole population.
It is likely that our argument can be extended to more general settings
with a higher dimension, a larger interaction range and many strategies.
Using results from Blume (1995), one can construct cohesive teams for
more general interaction ranges. Since contagion also works in a sim-
ilar fashion as in our case, the main idea of our proof applicable. Fur-
thermore, higher dimensional environment also allows the construction of
teams (hypercubes of the corresponding dimension), and the arguments
of Schonmann (1992) imply that the contagion mechanism works in the
same way, hence we believe that our proof can be applied. Finally, if we
consider many strategies, but there is a unique strategy A that it is a best
response to any conﬁguration where at least half of the opponents play A,
then stable teams can be constructed, and our proof can be applied.
We can also draw some conclusions about the relationship between
mutation and contagion in a more general local interaction environment
than the torus; see Morris (2000) and Young (1998, Chapter 6). The exis-
tence of cohesive groups and the contagion mechanism is essential for our
argument to work. If both cohesion and contagion favors the risks domi-
nant strategy, then the intuition behind our result implies that the number
of mutations required to eliminate a large group playing the risk dominant
strategy will depend on the size of the group. In contrast, to propagate the
riskdominantstrategythroughcontagionrequiresfewmutations, indepen-
dent of the population size. This asymmetry should ensure that results on
state-dependent mutations similar to ours are obtained in a more general
spatial environment.
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